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Introduction

In a landmark and tenant-landlord jurisprudence-shaping ruling, the Supreme Court of India has categorically reaffirmed a long-standing principle of Indian rent law: once a landlord proves a genuine (bona fide) requirement for a rented premises, the tenant cannot dictate how, where, or in what manner the landlord should use their own property.

The judgment, delivered on December 2, 2025, restored an eviction order concerning a commercial premises in Kamathipura, Nagpada, Mumbai, which had been set aside earlier by the Bombay High Court. The apex court held that the High Court exceeded its limited revisional jurisdiction by conducting what it described as a “microscopic scrutiny” of evidence, despite two lower courts having already concurred on the landlord’s bona fide need.

This decision is significant not only for landlords seeking eviction on genuine grounds but also for tenants, lawyers, property investors, and courts alike. It clarifies the limits of tenant objections, the scope of revisional powers, and the evidentiary threshold for bona fide requirement, while balancing equity by granting the tenant time until June 30, 2026, to vacate the premises.

Background of the Mumbai Property Dispute

The dispute revolved around a multi-storeyed property located in Kamathipura, Nagpada, one of Mumbai’s older mixed-use neighbourhoods.

Property Structure and Use

1. Ground Floor: Let out to a tenant for commercial use (a shop/premises).

2. Second & Third Floors: Used exclusively for residential purposes by the landlord and family.

Genesis of the Dispute

1. In 2016, the landlord initiated eviction proceedings seeking possession of the ground-floor commercial premises.

2. The stated reason was the bona fide requirement of the landlord’s daughter-in-law, who intended to use the premises for her work or business.

3. During the pendency of the case, the landlord obtained a commercial electricity connection for one room on the ground floor, which earlier had a residential connection.

The tenant resisted eviction by arguing that:

1. The landlord had alternative accommodation.

2. The landlord could use another part of the property.

3. The change in electricity connection showed lack of genuine need.

What Was the Case Really About?

At its core, the dispute raised three recurring legal questions in Indian rent control litigation:

1. Who decides the suitability of premises—the landlord or the tenant?

2. Can a tenant defeat eviction by suggesting alternative premises?

3. How far can a High Court re-examine facts in a revision petition?

Decisions of the Lower Courts

Trial Court Findings

The Trial Court:

1. Examined pleadings, documents, and oral evidence.

2. Accepted the landlord’s claim that the premises were genuinely required for the daughter-in-law’s work.

3. Found no mala fides or ulterior motive.

4. Ordered eviction of the tenant.

First Appellate Court

The tenant appealed.

The First Appellate Court:

1. Re-assessed the record.

2. Confirmed the Trial Court’s findings.

3. Held that the landlord had successfully proved bona fide need.

At this stage, two courts had concurrently recorded findings of fact in favour of the landlord.

Intervention by the Bombay High Court

After losing twice, the tenant approached the Bombay High Court in revision.

What the High Court Did

1. The High Court set aside the eviction order.

2. It re-examined the evidence in great detail.

3. It questioned:

   1. The landlord’s choice of premises.

   2. Availability of alternative spaces.

   3. The timing of obtaining a commercial electricity connection.

In effect, the High Court re-tried the case, reassessing factual findings already settled by two courts.

Supreme Court’s Intervention and Key Holding

Aggrieved, the landlord approached the Supreme Court of India through SLP (C) No. 30407 of 2024.

Core Holding

The Supreme Court held that:

1. The High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction.

2. Revisional courts cannot re-appreciate evidence like an appellate court unless there is a clear jurisdictional or legal error.

3. Tenants cannot dictate the suitability of premises or suggest alternatives once bona fide need is proved.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court:

1. Set aside the High Court judgment.

2. Restored the eviction orders passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the First Appellate Court.

Why Did the Landlord Succeed?

1. Limited Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court reiterated a settled principle:

When two courts have concurrently recorded findings of fact, a High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction cannot interfere merely because it holds a different view on facts.

The Court observed that the High Court indulged in “microscopic scrutiny” of pleadings and evidence, which is impermissible unless:

1. The lower courts acted without jurisdiction, or

2. There was a patent error of law.

Neither condition existed in this case.

2. Tenant Cannot Dictate Alternative Premises

One of the most crucial aspects of the ruling is the Court’s reaffirmation that:

A tenant cannot instruct the landlord where to start a business or which premises should be considered suitable.

The tenant’s argument that:

1. Other rooms existed, or

2. Another portion could suffice,

was rejected outright.

The Supreme Court relied on its earlier ruling in Bhupinder Singh Bawa v. Asha Devi, where it was held that the landlord is the best judge of the suitability of premises for his or her need.

3. Commercial Electricity Connection Did Not Defeat Bona Fide Need

The tenant argued that obtaining a commercial electricity connection after filing the eviction suit showed manipulation.

The Supreme Court clarified:

1. The premises were always commercially situated on the ground floor.

2. The residential nature of the electricity connection earlier did not negate the landlord’s genuine requirement.

3. Obtaining a commercial connection during litigation does not nullify bona fide need.

The Court emphasized that such factors cannot be used to defeat eviction in revisional proceedings.

Supreme Court’s Key Observations (Simplified)

The Supreme Court stated, in substance:

1. Revisional jurisdiction is not meant for re-appreciation of evidence.

2. High Courts should not behave like a second appellate court.

3. The landlord’s need for the ground-floor commercial premises was rightly accepted by lower courts.

4. Residential floors cannot be treated as viable alternatives for a commercial requirement.

Final Judgment and Operative Directions

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and passed the following directions:

Restoration of Eviction Order

1. High Court judgment set aside.

2. Trial Court and First Appellate Court judgments restored.

Time Granted to Vacate

Considering that the tenant had occupied the premises for nearly 50 years, the Court granted equitable relief:

1. Deadline to vacate: June 30, 2026

2. Conditions:

   1. Arrears of rent to be cleared within one month.

   2. Regular monthly rent to be paid till vacating.

   3. No third-party rights to be created.

   4. Undertaking to be filed before the Registrar, Bombay High Court within three weeks.

Consequences of Non-Compliance

1. Failure to file undertaking or breach of conditions allows the landlord to execute the decree immediately.

2. Time granted will not protect the tenant from execution proceedings.

3. Defiance may be treated as non-compliance of Supreme Court orders.

Legal Significance of the Judgment

For Landlords

1. Strengthens the right to reclaim property for genuine personal or family needs.

2. Confirms that landlords are not required to justify why one premises is better than another.

3. Protects against prolonged litigation due to tenant-suggested alternatives.

For Tenants

1. Clarifies that speculative objections will not defeat bona fide claims.

2. Reinforces the importance of fair resistance, not obstruction.

3. Highlights the limited remedies once concurrent findings exist.

For Courts

1. Reinforces judicial discipline regarding revisional jurisdiction.

2. Prevents reopening of settled facts without legal justification.

How This Judgment Fits into Indian Rent Law

Indian rent control jurisprudence often walks a tightrope between:

1. Protecting tenants from arbitrary eviction, and

2. Safeguarding landlords’ constitutional property rights.

This ruling strikes a careful balance:

1. It does not dilute tenant protection laws.

2. It ensures landlords are not trapped indefinitely despite genuine need.

By reaffirming earlier precedents, including Bhupinder Singh Bawa, the Supreme Court has brought consistency and predictability to eviction jurisprudence.

Practical Takeaways for Property Owners and Tenants

If You Are a Landlord

1. Clearly plead and prove bona fide need.

2. Document family requirements carefully.

3. Do not worry about tenant-suggested alternatives if your need is genuine.

4. Be prepared for scrutiny—but only within legal limits.

If You Are a Tenant

1. Understand that courts respect genuine landlord needs.

2. Avoid relying solely on alternative accommodation arguments.

3. Comply with court directions to avoid adverse consequences.

4. Seek negotiated timelines rather than prolonged litigation.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in restoring the eviction order sends a clear and authoritative message:

"A tenant’s right to occupy does not extend to controlling the landlord’s decision-making over their own property."

By curbing excessive revisional interference and reaffirming the doctrine that the landlord is the best judge of suitability, the judgment strengthens legal certainty in landlord-tenant relations across India.

At the same time, by granting the tenant time until June 30, 2026, the Court balanced strict legal principles with human considerations—an approach that lies at the heart of Indian constitutional adjudication.

For anyone dealing with rental disputes, this judgment is now a must-know precedent—one that will shape eviction litigation for years to come.

Land ownership in India is deeply connected with history, possession, records, and law. Many people have heard statements like “If someone occupies land for 12 years, it becomes theirs”. While this sounds simple, the legal reality is far more nuanced.

Understanding the “12-Year Rule” in Simple Terms

The so-called 12-year rule for land ownership in India is not a rule that automatically transfers ownership after 12 years. Instead, it is linked to a legal doctrine called adverse possession.

In short:

If a person occupies someone else’s land continuously, openly, and without permission for 12 years, and the real owner does nothing to reclaim it within that time, the occupier may get a legal right to claim ownership — but only through a court of law.

This rule comes from limitation law, not from property transfer law.

Legal Basis of the 12-Year Rule in India

The 12-year period originates from the Limitation Act, 1963, which sets time limits within which legal actions must be taken.

Key Legal Provision

• Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963

  1. Time limit to file a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property: 12 years

  2. The time starts when the possession becomes adverse

This means:

1. If the rightful owner fails to file a suit within 12 years, the law bars the remedy, and

2. The person in adverse possession may then seek a declaration of ownership

What Is Adverse Possession?

Definition in Plain Language

Adverse possession is a legal principle where a person who is not the owner occupies land in a manner that is:

1. Hostile to the true owner’s rights

2. Continuous for a legally prescribed period

3. Open and obvious to everyone

If all legal conditions are satisfied, the law may recognize the occupier as the new owner.

Why Does the Law Recognize Adverse Possession?

The doctrine exists for practical and policy reasons, not to reward illegal occupation.

Objectives Behind the Rule

1. Discouraging neglect of land

   • Owners must remain vigilant about their property.

2. Ensuring certainty in land ownership

   • Endless disputes harm land markets and development.

3. Protecting long-term settled possession

   • Law favors stability over dormant claims.

Courts have repeatedly stated that adverse possession is an exception, not the norm.

Essential Conditions for Adverse Possession (All Must Be Proven)

Merely staying on land for 12 years is not enough. Indian courts require strict proof of the following elements:

1. Actual and Physical Possession

1. The person must physically occupy the land.

2. Symbolic or paper possession does not count.

2. Open and Notorious Possession

1. The occupation must be visible and obvious.

2. Secret or hidden possession is invalid.

3. Continuous and Uninterrupted

1. No breaks for the entire 12-year period.

2. Even short interruptions can reset the clock.

4. Exclusive Possession

1. Possession must not be shared with the true owner.

2. Joint or permissive possession fails this test.

5. Hostile to the True Owner

1. “Hostile” means without permission, not violent.

2. Occupation must deny the owner’s title.

6. Peaceful Possession

• Possession obtained through force or fraud is invalid.

7. Animus Possidendi (Intention to Possess as Owner)

• The possessor must behave like an owner:

  1. Fencing land

  2. Cultivation

  3. Construction

  4. Preventing others from entering

What Does NOT Count as Adverse Possession?

Many misunderstandings exist. The following do not qualify:

1. Tenant occupation

2. Caretaker or watchman possession

3. Family member staying on ancestral land

4. Encroachment with owner’s consent

5. Temporary or seasonal use

6. Illegal possession under government schemes

7. Possession while acknowledging the owner’s title

Does Paying Property Tax Prove Ownership?

No, by itself.

Courts treat tax receipts as supporting evidence, not conclusive proof.

1. Tax payment ≠ ownership

2. Must be combined with hostile possession and other evidence

When Does the 12-Year Period Start?

This is a critical legal point.

The clock starts only when possession becomes adverse, meaning:

1. The occupier clearly denies the owner’s rights, and

2. The owner knows or should reasonably know about it

Example:

1. A tenant stops paying rent → possession becomes adverse only after clear denial

2. A caretaker builds a house claiming ownership → clock starts from that assertion

Is Ownership Automatic After 12 Years?

Absolutely not.

After 12 years:

1. Ownership does not change automatically

2. The possessor must:

   1. Approach a court

   2. File a suit for declaration of title

   3. Prove all legal conditions with evidence

Without a court decree, the land does not legally belong to the occupier.

Supreme Court’s View on Adverse Possession

Indian courts have taken a very strict stance.

The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly stated:

1. Adverse possession is a harsh doctrine

2. It must be proved with clear, cogent, and convincing evidence

3. Mere long possession is insufficient

Courts now demand higher standards of proof than in the past.

Can Government Land Be Claimed Through Adverse Possession?

Technically, yes — but practically, extremely difficult.

1. Claims against government land face stricter scrutiny

2. Courts are reluctant to allow private encroachment on public land

3. Strong documentary and historical evidence is required

In many cases, special statutes protect government land from adverse possession claims.

Difference Between Adverse Possession and Encroachment

What Should Landowners Do to Protect Their Property?

If you are a landowner, prevention is far easier than litigation.

Practical Safeguards

1. Regularly inspect your land

2. Maintain updated land records

3. Put boundary fencing

4. Install signboards

5. Respond to encroachments immediately

6. Send legal notices

7. File suit before 12 years expire

Even a single legal action interrupts adverse possession.

What If Someone Is Already Occupying Your Land?

Do not delay. Options include:

1. Filing a suit for possession

2. Injunction against further construction

3. Police complaint (if criminal trespass involved)

4. Revenue authority proceedings

Delay strengthens the occupier’s defence.

Can Family Members Claim Adverse Possession?

Usually no.

1. Family possession is presumed permissive

2. Strong proof of hostile intention is required

3. Courts rarely allow such claims

Role of Evidence in Adverse Possession Cases

Courts rely heavily on:

1. Revenue records

2. Witness testimony

3. Photographs

4. Electricity/water connections

5. Construction permissions (if any)

6. Long-term acts of ownership

The burden of proof is entirely on the claimant.

Common Myths About the 12-Year Rule

1. “12 years automatically makes me owner”

2. “Paying tax is enough”

3. “Government land is easy to claim”

4. “Court is not required”

5. “Silent owner loses rights automatically”

All of these are incorrect.

Recent Legal Trend: Narrowing the Scope

Indian courts are increasingly:

1. Protecting registered owners

2. Rejecting weak adverse possession claims

3. Emphasizing fairness and constitutional property rights

The doctrine survives, but under tight judicial control.

Practical Example

Example Scenario

1. Person A owns vacant land

2. Person B occupies it openly since 2010

3. Builds a boundary wall

4. Claims ownership publicly

5. A takes no legal action till 2023

In 2023:

1. B may attempt to claim adverse possession

2. Court will examine evidence strictly

3. Success is not guaranteed

Conclusion

The 12-year rule for land ownership in India is not a shortcut to ownership. It is a complex legal doctrine rooted in adverse possession and limitation law. Courts treat such claims with caution, demand strict proof, and prioritize genuine ownership rights.

If you are:

1. A landowner - stay vigilant

2. An occupier - seek legal advice before assuming rights

Property law rewards timely action, not assumptions.

Introduction: Why This Supreme Court Ruling Matters

The question of whether heavy industrial and mining machinery should be treated as “motor vehicles” under Indian law has troubled industries, tax authorities, and courts for decades. With increasing mechanisation, factories and mines routinely use dumpers, excavators, loaders, dozers, surface miners, and drills—all of which are mechanically propelled and capable of movement, yet rarely, if ever, touch public roads.

In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of India has now decisively clarified that heavy machinery used exclusively within factories or enclosed industrial premises is not liable for motor vehicle registration or road tax. This ruling brings long-awaited certainty to industries across India and reinforces the constitutional limits on State taxation powers.

The decision came in Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, where the Court examined the scope of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the taxing power of States under the Constitution.

Background of the Dispute

How the Issue Arose

The dispute originated in the State of Gujarat, where transport authorities issued directions requiring registration under Section 39 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and payment of motor vehicle tax under Section 3 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 for various categories of heavy machinery.

These machines included:

1. Dumpers

2. Loaders

3. Excavators

4. Dozers

5. Surface miners

6. Drilling equipment

Crucially, all these machines were used exclusively within factory and mining premises, which were fenced, controlled, and not accessible to the public. They were never driven on public roads.

Despite this, the authorities issued show-cause notices demanding:

1. Registration of the machinery

2. Payment of motor vehicle tax

3. Interest and penalty for alleged non-compliance

The Gujarat High Court upheld the State’s action, prompting the affected industries to approach the Supreme Court.

Legal Questions Before the Supreme Court

The appeals raised fundamental questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation:

1. Do heavy industrial machines used only inside factories qualify as “motor vehicles” under Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988?

2. Can a State levy motor vehicle tax on equipment that is not used or intended for use on public roads?

3. Does mere mechanical propulsion or theoretical mobility make machinery taxable as a motor vehicle?

Contentions of the Appellants (Industries)

Senior counsel appearing for the appellants advanced a structured and evidence-based argument.

1. Exclusion Under Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act

Section 2(28) defines a “motor vehicle” but expressly excludes:

“a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises.”

The appellants argued that:

1. The machinery was specially designed and manufactured for off-road industrial use

2. It was certified by manufacturers as unsuitable for ordinary road use

3. It lacked essential road-use features such as lighting systems, speed regulation, suspension suitable for highways, and compliance with road safety norms

2. Constitutional Limitation Under Entry 57, List II

The power of States to levy motor vehicle tax flows from Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which permits taxation only on:

“vehicles suitable for use on roads.”

The appellants emphasised that constitutional entries define the outer boundary of legislative power. A State statute cannot expand this scope by clever wording.

3. Actual and Intended Use Is Decisive

Evidence showed that the machinery:

1. Operated only within enclosed premises

2. Never used public roads

3. Did not derive any benefit from road infrastructure maintained by the State

Therefore, imposing road tax would be arbitrary and unconstitutional.

Contentions of the Respondent State of Gujarat

The State took a broader interpretation of both the statute and its taxing power.

1. Wide Language of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act

The State relied on Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, which authorises tax on:

“all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State.”

According to the State, the provision does not distinguish between on-road and off-road usage.

2. Mechanical Propulsion as the Test

The State argued that:

1. The machinery was mechanically propelled

2. It could move from one place to another

3. Some machines could theoretically be driven short distances on roads

Therefore, they fell within the broad definition of “motor vehicle” and attracted tax.

Constitutional Framework: The Foundation of the Judgment

Before interpreting statutes, the Supreme Court turned to the constitutional source of taxing power.

Entry 57, List II – A Built-In Limitation

Entry 57 authorises States to tax:

“vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads.”

The Court stressed that:

1. This phrase is not ornamental

2. It places a substantive constitutional limitation on State taxation

3. Any State law exceeding this limit is invalid to that extent

A taxing statute cannot enlarge the constitutional field by redefining what qualifies as a taxable vehicle.

Interpreting Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

The Court undertook a careful textual and purposive interpretation of Section 2(28).

Two Distinct Parts of the Definition

1. Inclusive Part – Covers mechanically propelled vehicles adapted for use on roads

2. Exclusionary Part – Expressly excludes special-type vehicles adapted only for factory or enclosed premises use

The Court held that:

1. The exclusion is deliberate and substantive

2. It must be given full legal effect

3. Treating it as incidental would render the exclusion meaningless

Key Judicial Observations

1. Capability Is Not the Same as Suitability

The Court made a crucial distinction:

A vehicle may be capable of movement, but that does not make it suitable for ordinary road use.

Design intent, certification, and actual use are decisive factors.

2. Actual Use Cannot Be Ignored

Where consistent evidence shows that machinery:

1. Is designed for off-road use

2. Is certified as such

3. Is actually confined to enclosed premises

…it cannot be artificially pulled into the tax net.

3. Warning Against Overbroad Interpretation

The Court cautioned that accepting the State’s argument would lead to absurd consequences, such as:

1. Military tanks being taxed as motor vehicles

2. Aircraft towing vehicles being treated as road vehicles

Such outcomes could never have been intended by the Constitution or Parliament.

Reliance on Landmark Precedents

Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa

The Court reaffirmed the principle from Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa:

1. “Adapted for use upon roads” means suitable for ordinary road use

2. Vehicles confined to enclosed premises are not taxable

Tarachand Logistic Solutions Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh

In Tarachand Logistic Solutions Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Court had held that:

1. Where a vehicle does not operate in a public place

2. And does not benefit from public roads

…imposing motor vehicle tax is unjustified.

The present judgment builds directly on these settled principles.

The Final Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and held that:

1. Heavy construction and industrial machinery used only within factories or enclosed premises

2. Is excluded from the definition of “motor vehicle” under Section 2(28)

3. Is not liable for registration under Section 39 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

4. Is not subject to motor vehicle tax under the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, unless actually used on public roads

The judgment was delivered by:

1. Justice Pankaj Mithal

2. Justice Prasanna B. Varale

Practical Impact of the Judgment

1. Relief for Industries and Manufacturers

Industries involved in:

1. Cement

2. Mining

3. Infrastructure

4. Power generation

5. Heavy manufacturing

will benefit from significant cost savings and reduced compliance burdens.

2. Clear Compliance Framework

Companies should now focus on:

1. Maintaining manufacturer certificates

2. Documenting exclusive off-road use

3. Ensuring machinery does not operate on public roads

3. Limits on State Tax Powers

States cannot expand motor vehicle taxation beyond the constitutional boundary of road suitability.

What If Such Machinery Is Occasionally Used on Roads?

The Court clarified that actual use matters. If:

1. Machinery is regularly or substantially used on public roads

2. Or modified for road suitability

…it may attract registration and tax for that period.

Conclusion: A Constitutionally Sound and Industry-Friendly Ruling

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat is a decisive reaffirmation of constitutional discipline in taxation. By holding that heavy machinery used exclusively within factories is not liable for road tax, the Court has:

1. Protected industries from arbitrary taxation

2. Clarified the scope of the Motor Vehicles Act

3. Reinforced the principle that taxation must align with constitutional authority and practical reality

For industries, compliance professionals, and policymakers alike, this judgment sets a clear, fair, and legally sound benchmark for the future.

Quick Case Reference

• Case Title: Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.

• Case No.: Civil Appeal Nos. 3352–3353 of 2017

• Court: Supreme Court of India

• Coram: Justice Pankaj Mithal & Justice Prasanna B. Varale

Introduction

In a landmark judgment with far-reaching implications for India’s taxation framework, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and the power sector, the Supreme Court of India has categorically ruled that customs duty cannot be levied on electricity generated within a Special Economic Zone and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA).

The ruling came while deciding an appeal filed by Adani Power Limited, which had challenged the continued levy of customs duty on electrical energy generated in its SEZ-based power project and supplied to consumers in the DTA.

At its core, the judgment reinforces a foundational principle of Indian constitutional law: no tax can be imposed or collected without clear authority of law. The Court held that the absence of a statutory charging provision under the Customs Act, 1962 could not be cured through exemption notifications, delegated legislation, or changes in duty rates.

This decision is not merely about one company or one sector. It reasserts constitutional discipline under Articles 14 and 265 of the Constitution of India, strengthens judicial precedent, and provides much-needed clarity for SEZ developers, power generators, policymakers, and tax authorities across the country.

Background of the Dispute

Adani Power’s SEZ-Based Power Project

Adani Power Limited operates a thermal power generation unit located within a Special Economic Zone, a legally notified area established to promote exports, investment, and economic development through fiscal and regulatory incentives.

Electricity generated from this SEZ unit was supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA), i.e., the rest of India outside the SEZ. Under the SEZ framework, goods supplied from an SEZ to the DTA are treated as “imports” for limited purposes, primarily to determine applicable duties and taxes.

The Government’s Attempt to Levy Customs Duty

Despite the fact that imported electrical energy attracts a nil rate of customs duty, the Union Government issued a series of notifications starting from 2010, attempting to levy customs duty on electricity supplied from SEZs to the DTA on a per-unit basis.

These notifications sought to treat electricity generated within India—but inside an SEZ—as if it were imported goods, thereby making it liable for customs duty.

The First Round: Gujarat High Court’s 2015 Judgment

Adani Power challenged these notifications before the Gujarat High Court. In its landmark judgment dated 15 July 2015, the High Court struck down the levy.

Key Findings of the Gujarat High Court (2015)

The High Court held that:

1. Electricity generated within India cannot be treated as “imported goods”

2. There was no charging event under Section 12 of the Customs Act

3. Delegated legislation under Section 25 (exemption notifications) cannot create a tax where none exists

4. Levying customs duty in this manner violated Article 265 of the Constitution, which mandates that tax must be authorised by law

5. The levy also offended Article 14, as it destroyed parity between imported electricity (nil duty) and domestically generated electricity

This declaration of law was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, thereby giving it binding force.

The Second Round: Continued Levy and the 2019 High Court Judgment

Despite the clear declaration of law in 2015, customs authorities continued to levy and collect duty for later periods, relying on subsequent notifications that revised the rate or structure of duty.

When Adani Power sought refunds and enforcement of the earlier judgment, a coordinate bench of the Gujarat High Court in 2019 denied relief. The High Court reasoned that since the later notifications were not specifically challenged, the benefit of the 2015 ruling could not be extended automatically.

This narrow interpretation led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court was called upon to decide:

1. Whether customs duty could legally be levied on electricity supplied from an SEZ to the DTA

2. Whether later notifications could revive a levy already declared illegal

3. Whether a citizen must repeatedly challenge successive notifications based on the same invalid legal foundation

4. Whether the 2015 judgment had continuing and binding effect

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Observations

A Bench comprising Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria undertook a detailed constitutional and statutory analysis.

1. Absence of a Charging Event Under the Customs Act

The Court reaffirmed that Section 12 of the Customs Act is the charging provision for customs duty. It applies only when there is import into, or export out of, India.

The Court categorically held:

“Electrical energy generated within India and wheeled into the Domestic Tariff Area is not, in truth, a case of import into India.”

Since electricity was generated domestically, the fundamental taxable event itself was missing.

2. Electricity Is Not “Imported Goods” in This Context

Although the SEZ Act treats supplies from SEZs to the DTA as imports for certain purposes, this legal fiction cannot override constitutional or statutory limits.

The Court clarified that:

1. Legal fictions must be strictly confined to the purpose for which they are created

2. They cannot be expanded to create a tax where the charging provision does not exist

3. Limits of Delegated Legislation Under Section 25

The Union argued that subsequent notifications issued under Section 25 of the Customs Act justified the levy.

The Court rejected this argument outright, holding that:

1. Section 25 only grants power to exempt or modify existing duties

2. It cannot create a new levy

3. Delegated legislation cannot cure the absence of legislative competence

The Court observed that what Parliament itself cannot do directly, cannot be done indirectly through subordinate legislation.

4. Parity Principle Under the SEZ Act

Under Section 30 of the SEZ Act, goods cleared from an SEZ to the DTA are chargeable to duties “as applicable to imported goods”.

The Supreme Court emphasised the parity principle:

1. Imported electricity attracts nil customs duty

2. Therefore, electricity supplied from an SEZ to the DTA cannot be subjected to a higher or different duty

Since this statutory position remained unchanged after 2015, the Court found no justification for a different outcome in later years.

5. Binding Nature of the 2015 Declaration of Law

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is its reaffirmation of judicial discipline and precedent.

The Court held:

“Once a declaration of law is rendered and affirmed by this Court, it acquires binding normative force and governs all transactions resting on the same legal footing.”

The 2019 High Court decision was criticised for narrowing the scope of a coordinate bench’s judgment without referring the matter to a larger bench, which violated settled principles of judicial propriety.

6. No Need to Repeatedly Challenge Identical Illegality

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that Adani Power should have separately challenged every subsequent notification.

It held that:

1. Courts do not function on “technical formalism”

2. A citizen cannot be compelled to repeatedly litigate against the same illegality clothed in different forms

3. Once the foundation of a levy is struck down, all derivative actions fall automatically

7. Colourable Exercise of Power

The Court characterised the impugned notifications as a “colourable exercise of delegated power”, observing that merely altering the rate or timing of the levy does not legitimise an unconstitutional tax.

Constitutional Dimensions of the Judgment

Article 265: Authority of Law

Article 265 of the Constitution mandates:

“No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.”

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that executive convenience or revenue considerations cannot override constitutional mandates.

Article 14: Equality Before Law

The levy was also found to violate Article 14, as it created arbitrary discrimination between:

1. Imported electricity (nil duty)

2. Domestically generated electricity supplied from SEZs

Final Decision and Directions

The Supreme Court:

1. Set aside the 2019 judgment of the Gujarat High Court

2. Allowed the appeal filed by Adani Power Limited

3. Declared that the customs duty levied on electricity supplied from SEZs to the DTA lacked authority of law

4. Directed the Union of India and customs authorities to refund the amounts collected, after verification, without interest

5. Ordered that no further demands be enforced for the period covered by the appeal

Importantly, the Court clarified that:

Its findings are confined to the existing statutory framework and do not prevent Parliament from enacting a future legislative regime, if it so chooses.

Broader Implications of the Judgment

For SEZ Developers and Power Producers

1. Provides long-term tax certainty

2. Prevents retrospective or indirect levies

3. Reinforces investor confidence in SEZ policy

For Tax Administration

1. Reaffirms limits of delegated legislation

2. Emphasises constitutional compliance over revenue considerations

For Constitutional Jurisprudence

1. Strengthens the doctrine of precedent

2. Protects taxpayers from repetitive litigation

3. Upholds the rule of law

Cause Title and Appearances

Case: Adani Power Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1

For the Appellant:
Senior Advocate P. Chidambaram

For the Respondents:
Raghvendra P. Shankar, Additional Solicitor General

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in favour of Adani Power is a landmark affirmation of constitutional tax discipline. By holding that customs duty cannot be levied on electricity supplied from SEZs in the absence of a statutory charging event, the Court has reinforced the supremacy of law over executive action.

More importantly, the judgment sends a clear message: illegal levies cannot be sustained through procedural manoeuvres, altered rates, or repeated notifications. Stability, predictability, and respect for judicial outcomes remain central to India’s constitutional order.

For businesses, policymakers, and legal practitioners alike, this decision stands as a powerful reminder that taxation must always flow from law—not convenience.

Introduction

In real estate transactions, an “Agreement to Sell” (ATS) is often the first step: the vendor promises to sell immovable property to the vendee on specified terms and the vendee promises or shows readiness to pay the balance consideration and complete the formalities (sale deed, registration, delivery of possession). Over decades, Indian courts have developed extensive jurisprudence on when an ATS may be enforced (via a suit for specific performance) and when it may be cancelled, rescinded or determined.

A recurring question is: Can one party simply “unilaterally” terminate an ATS (i.e., one party cancels the agreement) if the contract does not contain a clause permitting such termination? The new Supreme Court ruling answers this in the negative — unilateral termination is invalid if the contract is non-determinable (i.e., it does not itself allow termination) and the vendee can directly move for specific performance without first filing a separate declaratory suit to challenge the termination.

This article explains that ruling, the legal background, its significance, practical implications for property transactions and how parties must approach ATSs going forward.

What is an Agreement to Sell and its legal significance

An Agreement to Sell is a contract under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and may also be enforced under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA). While it is not the final sale deed, it is a binding commitment by the parties: the vendor to sell and the vendee to buy, subject to fulfilment of conditions (payment of balance, obtaining approvals etc.).

Once the vendee shows readiness and willingness to perform, Indian courts frequently grant relief of specific performance under the SRA, compelling the vendor to execute the sale deed and transfer the property. The relevant sections are Sections 14-18 of the SRA (on specific performance) and Sections 27-31 (on declaratory relief/rescission).

From a practical viewpoint:

1. The ATS gives the vendee rights (e.g., to insist on performance, to seek refund of earnest money and/or damages if conditions are not met).

2. The vendor is obligated to abide by the terms (unless the contract allows a right of termination, or time is of the essence, or there is a default by the vendee).

3. If the vendor refuses to perform, the vendee may file a suit for specific performance (or alternately for refund + damages).

Given this framework, a vendor may sometimes attempt to terminate the ATS unilaterally (for example by issuing a “termination notice” or “cancellation letter”). The key question is: Is such termination legally valid, particularly when the contract itself does not provide a termination clause?

The Supreme Court ruling: Key facts and ratio

Facts of the case

In the case of K. S. Manjunath & Ors. vs. Moora­savirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil (Deceased) by his LRs & Ors. (2025) (hereafter “Manjunath case”), the following facts arose:

1. On 28 April 2000, an ATS was executed for sale of about 354 acres of agricultural land in Basavanakoppa village, Haveri district, Karnataka. The sale consideration was approx. ₹26.95 lakh and an advance of about ₹9.45 lakh (or ₹2 lakh in some reports) had been paid.

2. The vendor later issued a letter in 2003 unilaterally terminating the ATS, citing reasons such as a “status quo order” in a litigation and death of one vendor. Subsequently the land was sold to third parties in 2007.

3. The vendees filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court initially rejected it and granted refund and damages. The High Court reversed, directed sale deed execution in their favour and held subsequent purchasers were not bona fide. On appeal to SC, the judgment of High Court was affirmed.

Ratio (legal principle)

The Supreme Court held:

1. A party cannot unilaterally terminate an ATS that is non-determinable unless the contract itself expressly allows such termination (i.e., is determinable in nature under Section 14 of the SRA).

2. If the contract gives no right to terminate unilaterally (or that right has been waived) and one party still does so, then that termination is in fact a breach by repudiation, and the non-terminating party can directly seek specific performance without first seeking a declaration that the termination was bad in law.

3. Placing the burden on the vendee to first challenge the termination would unfairly allow every suit for specific performance to be frustrated by the vendor raising unilateral termination as a defense. The Court observed that if unilateral termination were permitted simply because the vender says “I cancel”, then the vendee, even after performing his obligations, is forced to fight an extra battle.

4. The burden of approaching the court for a declaration lies primarily with the party who claims there was valid termination/rescission (the terminating party) — though the Court underscored that this is not mandatory in all circumstances.

The Court summarised six key principles:

1. Unilateral termination of an agreement to sell by one party is impermissible in law except where the agreement is itself determinable under Section 14 of the SRA.

2. If such unilateral termination of a non-determinable agreement is allowed as a defence, virtually any suit for specific performance can be frustrated by that device.

3. Where a party claims valid reasons to terminate or rescind, it is more appropriate that the terminating party approaches the court for declaration of such termination, rather than casting the burden on the non-terminating party.

4. That does not mean the non-terminating party must always first sue for declaratory relief—once unilateral termination is shown to be non-bona fide and without contractual basis, the vendee may proceed directly for specific performance.

5. If the contract gives no termination right and unilateral termination is effected, it is a repudiation. The vendee’s suit for specific performance can proceed.

6. In such event, the ATS remains subsisting and enforceable.

Why the ruling matters: Practical significance

Reinforces contractual sanctity

One of the key take-aways is the reinforcement of the principle that contracts must be honoured, especially in property transactions. If the ATS does not provide a termination clause, one cannot simply cancel it at one’s whim. This provides greater certainty and fairness to vendees who rely on the agreement.

Protection for genuine vendees

Often, a vendee pays advance/earnest money and takes steps (obtaining loan, approvals, relocating tenants, etc.). If the vendor later tries to cancel unilaterally without justification, the vendee has clear protection under this judgment: the vendee can proceed for specific performance directly, rather than first fighting a separate declaratory suit.

Prevents misuse of termination as defense

The Court flagged that allowing unilateral termination as a defense would open the flood-gates: every vendor could say “I cancel” and stop the suit, forcing the vendee to first get a declaration. That invites delay, expense and uncertainty. The ruling plugs that gap.

Clarifies when termination may be permissible

The judgment does not say termination can never happen. If the contract is determinable in nature (i.e., contains a clause that the vendor may rescind/terminate or the contract by its nature allows termination), then unilateral termination might be valid under Section 14 of the SRA. Parties and lawyers must examine whether the ATS contains such a clause.

Impact on subsequent purchasers

As the judgment also discusses (see § 19(b) below), if a vendor unilaterally terminates the ATS and sells to a third party, the original vendee may still enforce their rights. A subsequent purchaser may not claim bona fide purchaser protection if they had notice of the ATS or should have made inquiry. Thus the ruling strengthens the original vendee’s position against subsequent transfers.

Legal framework: What the law says

Specific Relief Act, 1963

• Section 14: Deals with non-determinable contracts (contracts not determinable by the parties by notice) and determinable contracts (contracts the parties may terminate by notice). If contract is determinable, one party may serve notice to determine the contract; if non-determinable, specific performance is ordinarily available when the vendee shows readiness and willingness.

• Sections 14-18: Relate to the remedy of specific performance. Key prerequisites: valid contract, performance by plaintiff, readiness & willingness, no bar under Section 20.

• Sections 27-31: Deal with relief by way of declaration, rescission and cancellation of contracts.

In the Manjunath case the Court emphasised the interplay: if contract is non-determinable (i.e., no right of unilateral termination), then termination letter becomes repudiation and vendee can directly rely on Sections 14–18 for specific performance.

Indian Contract Act, 1872

While the SRA provides the specific performance remedy, the Contract Act supplies general contract law principles: offer, acceptance, consideration, capacity, contract enforcement, breach, etc. A termination that is not permitted by the contract may amount to a breach of contract under the Contract Act.

Bona fide purchaser protection – Section 19(b) of SRA

Section 19(b) provides protection to a “transferee for value without notice” of the prior contract. The Manjunath judgment also addresses this: since the vendor attempted a unilateral termination and sold to third parties, the subsequent purchasers sought protection under 19(b). The SC held that since the termination was unilateral and the purchasers had notice (actual or constructive) of the prior ATS, they could not claim protection.

Thus the inter-play: vendor cannot terminate unilaterally and then sell to a third party expecting that the third party will be protected—if the third party knew (or should have known) of the prior ATS, protection fails.

When is unilateral termination valid – the “determinable contract” exception

The ruling makes clear that unilateral termination is valid only in limited circumstances: when the contract itself is determinable by its nature, or contains an express termination or rescission clause. If the ATS says “vendor may terminate by giving X days’ notice” or “time is of the essence, and in event of purchaser default vendor may rescind”, then the contract is determinable and termination is likely valid (subject to other conditions). The Court said: “except in cases where the agreement itself is determinable in nature in terms of Section 14.”

Key features to check in a determinable contract:

1. A clause expressly giving one party (usually the vendor) the option to determine/terminate the agreement (e.g., default clause, time-essence clause, waiver of purchaser rights).

2. A stipulation that time is of the essence and the vendee must complete by a certain date or lose rights.

3. Provisions for “governing in case of default” and “termination by notice” language.

If none of these exist and the ATS is silent or says simply “we agree to sell on terms set out”, then the ATS is non-determinable and the unilateral termination is invalid.

Who bears the burden? Declaration vs direct suit for specific performance

One important procedural clarification: Earlier case-law (for example, I.S. Sikandar (Dead) by LRs v. K. Subramani & Ors. (2013) 15 SCC 27) held that if an ATS has been terminated, a suit for specific performance may not be maintainable unless the vendee also prays for declaration that the termination was void.

However, the 2025 Supreme Court ruling departs from that rigid approach in respect of non-determinable ATSs. The Court observed:

“If a contract itself gives no right to unilaterally terminate the contract … and a party still terminates the contract unilaterally, then that termination would amount to a breach by repudiation and the non-terminating party can directly seek specific performance without first seeking a declaration.”

In other words:

1. If termination was within contractual rights (determinable), then a declaration suit or challenge may be required.

2. But if termination is invalid (non-determinable contract, no right to terminate unilaterally) then the vendee need not first sue for a declaration; he can directly invoke specific performance.

The Court added that burden to show the termination was valid lies with the terminating party (vendor) who raises termination as a defence. “Where a party claims to have valid reasons to terminate … it should ideally approach the court for a declaration.”

Hence, for practitioners: In drafting or litigating ATS disputes, it is critical to examine the nature of the contract (determinable or not) and frame the relief accordingly.

What the vendee (buyer) must do: Readiness and willingness, maintaining eligibility

Even when termination is invalid, the vendee must still satisfy the classic prerequisites for specific performance:

1. Existence of a valid and enforceable contract (ATS).

2. The vendee must have performed or is willing and able to perform his part (payment of balance consideration, meeting conditions, etc.).

3. The vendor must be in default or refusing to perform (not time or other barrier).

4. The relief must be grantable (not barred by Section 20 of SRA or other equitable defence).

In the Manjunath case the original vendees had shown readiness and willingness and the High Court’s decree was affirmed by SC.

It is advisable that the vendee:

1. Keep clear record of advance/earnest payment/part payment.

2. Be ready with bank statements, evidence of willingness (for example, remaining balance amount ready).

3. Ensure no material default (e.g., delay in payment if time is of the essence).

4. Note that the vendor’s unilateral termination letter will likely be seen as repudiation; the vendee must not treat it as final without consultation.

What the vendor (seller) must take care of

From the vendor’s perspective, this judgment means:

1. You cannot assume that issuing a unilateral termination letter ends the ATS unless the contract permits termination.

2. If you believe the ATS is terminable (due to purchaser default or a clause), you must act carefully: comply with clause, give notice, follow contract terms.

3. If the purchaser is ready and willing and there is no clause for termination, your attempted unilateral termination is likely invalid and you could be forced to execute sale deed under decree.

4. If you sell to a third party after purported termination, you risk the third party being held liable (if they had notice of the ATS) and you may face a suit for specific performance by original vendee.

5. Ensure that any termination or rescission is documented properly and preferably challenged/validated in court rather than simply assumed.

What third-party purchasers must beware of

The judgment also provides important guidance for subsequent purchasers of property where an ATS is in existence:

1. Under Section 19(b) of SRA, a subsequent purchaser may claim protection as a “transferee for value without notice” of the prior contract. But the Court held that if the original vendor attempted unilateral termination, that termination being invalid, the existence of the ATS continues. The subsequent purchaser cannot claim bona fide purchaser protection if they had actual or constructive notice of the ATS.

2. Even if the subsequent purchaser argues ignorance of the earlier ATS, the Court emphasised that when the termination notice itself was unilateral (and disclosed names & addresses of original vendees) the purchaser should have inquired further. Failure to do so may amount to constructive notice.

3. Thus, due diligence is critical: checking land records, verifying existing agreements to sell, asking the vendor for earlier documents, etc. Ignorance of an ATS will not always protect the purchaser if they failed to inquire when circumstances demanded it.

How to structure an ATS (and contractual drafting tips)

Given the risks under the new ruling, the following practical drafting tips emerge:

1. Termination/Rescission Clause: If the parties wish to allow termination, include a clear clause specifying when and how termination may be effected (e.g., purchaser’s default, vendor’s inability, force-majeure, time-essence clause).

2. Time‐essence clause: Specify dates for payment, sale deed execution, delivery of possession. If time is of the essence, then delay may permit termination.

3. Readiness & Willingness clause: Ensure the vendee commits to remaining ready and willing; vendor obtains assurances.

4. Notice of termination: If termination is possible, specify notice period, manner (registered letter, acknowledgment) and any refund/forfeiture mechanism.

5. Refund/forfeiture of earnest money: If vendor terminates, specify whether earnest money will be refunded or forfeited, and whether withdrawal is allowed.

6. Assignment clause: If vendor subsequently sells to a third party, specify how the ATS will be binding on successors and how notice to third parties will be given.

7. Registrability check: Ensure parties know when ATS needs registration (if at all) and any stamp duty/registration formalities.

8. Contingencies and approvals: If sale is subject to approvals (governmental, cooperative society, court orders, tenant relocation), define the condition precedent and timeline.

9. Conflict resolution clause: Provide for arbitration/mediation, jurisdiction, etc.

10. Legal compliance: Consider provisions for RERA (if applicable), land-use change, statutory compliance, etc.

Well‐drafted ATSs reduce litigation risk and clarify parties’ rights in case of disputes. The new ruling emphasises that in absence of termination clause, unilateral termination will not succeed.

Illustrative scenarios : What courts will decide

To better understand how this ruling plays out, consider the following hypothetical scenarios:

Scenario 1: Vendor and Vendee sign an ATS for property, payable in two instalments, with no termination clause. Vendee pays an earnest amount and obtains loan sanction. Vendor later issues a letter unilaterally terminating ATS citing “change of mind”. Vendee sues for specific performance.
– Under Manjunath ruling: ATS is non-determinable; termination invalid; vendee can directly sue for specific performance.
– Vendor cannot rely on termination as defence; must defend on other grounds (vendee default, time not of the essence, contract void).
– If vendee shows readiness & willingness, court likely grant decree for specific performance.

Scenario 2: ATS includes a clause: “If purchaser fails to pay the balance within 90 days, vendor may terminate this agreement by notice in writing.” Vendee fails to pay in time; vendor gives notice and cancels; vendor then sells to third party; vendee sues.
– Here ATS is determinable by contract (termination clause). Vendor’s termination may be valid if conditions met. Vendee may need to challenge termination via declaratory suit or show that vendor mis-applied the clause.
– If third party buys without notice, they may claim bona fide purchaser protection under Section 19(b). The Manjunath ruling does not automatically apply to determinable contracts.

Scenario 3: ATS is silent on termination, time for payment is 100 days but vendor imposes no explicit “time is of essence” clause. Vendee delays but eventually pays with extension; vendor issues cancellation letter saying “we cannot wait further.” Vendee sues.
– Under Manjunath, vendor cannot unilaterally cancel unless contract permitted termination; time-frame alone may not make contract determinable. The vendee may succeed, subject to readiness/willingness; vendor may try to argue delay was material but must prove default.
– Practical risk: vendor may defend on ground of default or delay, so vendee must show they were ready and willing, and vendor’s delay was unreasonably long or vendor waived time.

These scenarios show that the key questions courts will ask: Was ATS determinable? Was termination clause present? Did vendee perform or was ready & willing? Did vendor have basis to terminate? Any genuine default? Notice to third parties? Etc.

What practitioners should watch out for

Given this ruling, lawyers, legal advisers, property consultants should pay attention to:

• Vendor’s termination letter/notice: If unilateral, a warning sign that vendee may have rights despite vendor’s claim of cancellation.

• Due diligence by purchasers: Upcoming buyers must check whether an ATS exists, whether any termination was genuine, whether the vendor has authority to transfer, and whether they are protected under Section 19(b).

• Drafting ATSs carefully: Avoid ambiguous “termination” language; clarify rights and obligations.

• Readiness & willingness evidence: Vendee must keep documentary proof (bank loans, payment receipts, correspondence, approvals).

• Time is of essence clauses: If parties intend time to be of essence, clearly draft it; avoid leaving to future dispute over default.

• Notice to third parties: If vendor wants to sell to third parties, ensure that existing ATSs are disclosed or extinguished by proper surrender/waiver, to avoid later enforcement.

• Registration and stamp duty: Even if ATS is unregistered, Indian courts have held certain effects. But registration may improve enforceability and transparency.

• Equitable defences and limitation: Vendor may still defend based on purchaser’s default, illegality, lack of capacity, misrepresentation or limitation, so vendeur’s suit is not automatic.

• Subsequent purchaser’s risk: Buying property after vendor issued cancellation is risky — the court emphasised that noticing a termination letter pointing to unilateral cancellation should trigger inquiry; failure may mean no bona fide purchaser protection.

Limitations and cautions: Not a blanket rule

While the Manjunath ruling is powerful, it is important to appreciate its boundaries:

1. It is explicitly restricted to non-determinable agreements to sell (i.e., ATSs without clause permitting termination). If the ATS is determinable, old jurisprudence applies and a declaration suit may still be necessary.

2. The vendee still has to show readiness & willingness; termination alone does not guarantee decree. If the vendee himself is in breach, vendor may justify termination and defend suit.

3. Though unilateral termination is invalid per this ruling, there may be other legally valid ways to rescind ATS (e.g., purchaser default, mutual cancellation, frustration, illegality). Vendor must look into these.

4. The ruling applies to the facts of the Indian Supreme Court; local High Court jurisprudence and facts may vary. Lawyers should examine whether earlier case-law on determinable/non-determinable ATS remains relevant in their jurisdiction.

5. Third-party purchasers may still be protected under Section 19(b) if they satisfy criteria (value, good faith, no notice) and did their due diligence. The ruling strengthens the standard of due diligence but does not eliminate bona fide purchaser protection altogether.

6. The ruling does not elaborate on every type of transaction (for example, development agreements, sale of flats under RERA, share transfers) – the specific nature of the contract may influence analysis (whether it is truly an ATS, conditions precedent, etc.).

Practical checklist for clients and advisors

For the Vendee (buyer under ATS):

1. Verify the ATS: date, parties, consideration, advance/earnest money, payment schedule, conditions (approvals, possession, etc.).

2. Check whether the ATS contains a termination clause or a “time is of essence” clause.

   1. If yes → contract may be determinable → termination may be valid → you may need to challenge termination via declaratory suit, show vendor mis-applied clause.

   2. If no → contract likely non-determinable → termination likely invalid → you may proceed for specific performance.

3. Maintain evidence of your performance or readiness: advance payment, loan sanction, approvals, etc.

4. If the vendor issues a termination/cancellation notice, do not assume it ends your rights — preserve position, consult lawyer.

5. If vendor sells to someone else, examine whether you were given notice, whether the third‐party purchaser had notice of the ATS, whether you can claim specific performance.

6. Act with stated timelines: do not sit on rights; limitation periods may apply for suit for specific performance (generally three years from breach/default).

7. Document communications: termination letters, vendor’s reasons, your correspondence of readiness & willingness.

For the Vendor (seller under ATS):

1. Before executing ATS, consider whether you may need flexibility; if yes, include termination clause and “time is of essence” provision.

2. If you believe purchaser is defaulting (delay in payment, failure of condition), follow the ATS clause for termination (give notice, wait for period, document purchaser’s default).

3. Avoid issuing a letter saying “Cancellation by change of mind / we cannot wait”. Such termination may be held invalid.

4. If you sell to a third party after attempted termination, ensure you address the prior ATS: either get release from vendee, refund earnest money, knockout original ATS by consent or ensure purchaser is bona fide and no notice of prior ATS.

5. Keep records of attempts to execute sale deed, possession, payment of balance, so you can show you were ready to perform.

6. If you intend to terminate but contract silent, consult legal advice: you risk suit for specific performance.

7. If there is tenant relocation, litigation or cooperative society approval pending (i.e., condition precedent), clearly document it — failure to do so may be held as vendor’s inability, not purchaser’s fault.

For Subsequent Purchaser (third-party buyer):

1. Before purchasing property, conduct thorough due diligence:

   1. Search land records for earlier ATS/agreements to sell, encumbrance certificate, registered/unregistered instruments.

   2. Check whether the vendor had issued any termination letter; if yes, examine whether termination was valid or merely unilateral.

   3. Ask vendor for copies of prior ATS, termination notices, correspondence with earlier vendee.

   4. If you find a termination letter referencing the ATS and names of vendees, treat it as red flag for “constructive notice”.

2. If you still proceed, try to purchase with clear title, ensure vendor gives covenant of no earlier claims, ask for release/wavier from earlier vendees if possible.

3. Note: If a court later holds the termination invalid, you may find yourself liable to perform the ATS, execute sale deed in favour of original vendee, and may lose your purchase.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in the Manjunath case marks a landmark clarification for property law in India: when an Agreement to Sell is non-determinable, a vendor cannot unilaterally terminate it simply by issuing a letter; such action would amount to repudiation, and the vendee may proceed directly for specific performance without first seeking a declaration.

This decision underscores several themes: the sanctity of contracts, protection for genuine vendees, the importance of fair dealing and the duty of subsequent purchasers to undertake proper enquiry. It also underscores the need for careful drafting of ATSs and the practical discipline required by practitioners advising clients in real estate transactions.

In effect: If you’re entering an ATS, check the termination clause (or absence thereof) carefully. If you’re a buyer whose vendor tries to cancel unilaterally, don’t assume termination is valid — seek advice. If you’re buying property from someone who has claimed to cancel an ATS, do your due diligence.

For legal professionals and property advisers, the ruling offers both a powerful tool for enforcing rights of vendees and a caution for vendors or buyers who may neglect contractual formalities. As with all legal matters, each case will turn on its facts — readiness & willingness, contract terms, vendor’s ability to perform, time-essence, etc. But the broad new principle is clear: unilateral termination without contractual basis will not easily stand.

Introduction

The relationship between law enforcement and economic growth has always been delicate in India’s fast-evolving commercial landscape. When powerful legal mechanisms like the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) intersect with industries that employ thousands, the stakes are enormous. A recent Supreme Court development involving Roop Bansal, a senior figure in M3M, a major real estate developer, has reignited debate on whether India’s enforcement framework should evolve beyond rigid asset freezes toward balanced solutions that also protect innocent stakeholders.

In July 2025, the Supreme Court allowed the substitution of provisionally attached properties—a decision that could reshape the way enforcement agencies act under PMLA. Although the order is case-specific and does not create binding precedent, it has raised critical policy questions. Could litigation like this pave the way for new legislation that balances robust enforcement with economic continuity? This blog examines the Roop Bansal case, explores its legal and economic context, and considers its long-term implications for India’s enforcement policies.

Background: PMLA and Its Enforcement Mandate

The Purpose of PMLA

The PMLA was enacted in 2002 to combat money laundering and confiscate assets derived from crime. Section 5 empowers the Enforcement Directorate (ED) to provisionally attach property suspected to be “proceeds of crime” even before trial or conviction. The idea is to prevent accused parties from dissipating assets before the law can act.

The Enforcement Dilemma

While pre-emptive attachment safeguards public funds, it can also halt legitimate commercial activity. Real estate projects, for instance, involve investments from homebuyers, banks, and contractors—many of whom have no connection to alleged offences. Freezing operational assets midstream can:

1. Leave homebuyers stranded without possession or refunds.

2. Put workers and vendors out of jobs.

3. Trigger defaults on loans, affecting financial institutions.

4. Reduce tax revenues for state governments.

The Roop Bansal matter exposes this tension between strict enforcement and economic stability.

The Roop Bansal Case: What Happened

Facts in Brief

1. The ED provisionally attached properties linked to M3M under suspicion of being connected to proceeds of crime.

2. Instead of contesting the attachment outright, Roop Bansal’s legal team proposed substitution—offering built-up commercial assets of equal value to the ED.

3. The Supreme Court accepted this substitution, ensuring enforcement interests were protected while allowing ongoing projects to continue.

Why It Matters

This is the first high-profile instance where asset substitution has been allowed at this scale. The Court’s reasoning was rooted in:

1. Protecting innocent third parties (homebuyers, employees).

2. Preserving economic activity that generates taxes and jobs.

3. Maintaining ED’s security interest against dissipation of alleged proceeds of crime.

Judicial Discretion as a Policy Catalyst

Silence in the Statute

The PMLA does not explicitly allow substitution of attached properties. Chapter III outlines attachment and adjudication procedures but remains silent on alternatives.

Inherent Powers of the Supreme Court

The Court relied on its inherent powers to balance enforcement objectives with public interest. By crafting a solution outside statutory text, it demonstrated how judicial discretion can catalyze policy innovation.

A Precedent for Discussion, Not for Courts Alone

While this order does not bind lower courts, it sets a persuasive example. Future litigants and policymakers may look to it as evidence that enforcement rigidity can be tempered when wider socio-economic consequences are at stake.

Economic Impact: Real Estate, Employment, and Public Interest

The Scale of M3M’s Operations

M3M’s projects reportedly created over 1 lakh jobs and affected 5 lakh stakeholders. A blanket freeze could have disrupted:

1. Home deliveries to thousands of buyers.

2. Livelihoods for construction workers.

3. State revenues from stamp duty and GST.

Ripple Effects on the Economy

Freezing operational assets in such cases could lead to:

1. Investor flight—both domestic and foreign.

2. Delayed infrastructure projects, increasing costs.

3. Loss of public trust in regulatory fairness.

The substitution approach preserved economic continuity without compromising enforcement.

Key Legal Questions Raised

Should Substitution Be Codified?

A statutory framework could formalize substitution, ensuring:

1. Clear guidelines on when and how substitution is permissible.

2. Transparency for all stakeholders.

3. Reduced litigation due to consistent procedures.

How to Assess Proportionality?

Policymakers must define proportionality standards:

1. Should the value of substituted assets exceed the original attachment by a buffer?

2. How to ensure liquidity and marketability of substituted assets?

Public Interest Considerations

Future enforcement policy might explicitly weigh public interest, especially for industries like real estate or infrastructure.

Comparative Perspective: Global Practices

Many jurisdictions allow alternative enforcement mechanisms:

• United Kingdom: Courts may permit undertakings or charge replacements.

• United States: Asset substitution is codified under specific statutes to prevent disruption of ongoing businesses.

• Singapore: Authorities balance asset freezes with economic continuity in large-scale projects.

India’s move toward substitution could align its enforcement with international best practices.

Potential Legislative Pathways

Amendments to PMLA

Parliament could:

1. Add a new section explicitly permitting substitution under strict safeguards.

2. Define time limits for evaluating substitution proposals.

3. Mandate public interest impact assessments for large-scale attachments.

Guidelines for ED

Even without immediate legislative change, the Ministry of Finance or ED could issue operational guidelines. This would:

1. Provide certainty to businesses.

2. Reduce judicial workload by preventing repetitive litigation.

3. Protect innocent third parties.

Implications for Real Estate and Infrastructure

Boosting Investor Confidence

Clear rules on substitution can:

1. Encourage foreign direct investment.

2. Reassure domestic developers that genuine projects won’t be unnecessarily stalled.

Protecting Homebuyers and Workers

By preventing project stoppages, substitution safeguards:

1. Homebuyers’ investments.

2. Jobs and wages for workers.

3. Timely delivery of urban infrastructure.

Challenges and Criticisms

Risk of Abuse

Critics may argue that substitution could become a loophole for offenders to shield ill-gotten assets. Safeguards are crucial:

1. Rigorous valuation of substituted assets.

2. Independent verification by neutral experts.

3. Continuous monitoring of substituted property status.

Administrative Burden

The ED may face increased workload in evaluating and monitoring substituted assets. Adequate training and resources will be essential.

Broader Policy Implications

Balancing Enforcement and Economy

The case highlights the need for holistic policy design—one that deters crime but does not cripple economic engines.

A Template for Other Sectors

Beyond real estate, industries such as banking, telecom, and infrastructure could benefit from similar approaches when enforcement action risks widespread disruption.

The Role of Stakeholders

Judiciary

Courts can continue to fill legislative gaps where urgent economic interests are at stake.

Legislature

Lawmakers can use this case as a reference point to introduce amendments.

Businesses

Corporations must maintain robust compliance frameworks to minimize risk and demonstrate good faith during investigations.

Civil Society and Media

Public scrutiny ensures that flexibility in enforcement is not misused for favoritism or corruption.

Lessons for Compliance and Risk Management

Strengthening Internal Controls

Companies should:

1. Maintain transparent records.

2. Regularly audit financial transactions.

3. Develop contingency plans for enforcement actions.

Engaging Proactively with Regulators

Proactive communication with enforcement agencies can build trust and may open doors for negotiated solutions like substitution.

From Litigation to Legislation: The Road Ahead

The Roop Bansal case underscores a broader truth: litigation often drives legislative evolution. Similar to how landmark judgments in privacy or environmental law shaped India’s statutes, this matter could prompt Parliament to refine the PMLA framework.

Possible future developments include:

1. Introduction of a Substitution Clause within PMLA.

2. Creation of Public Interest Impact Reports for major attachments.

3. Establishment of special benches to expedite substitution matters.

Practical Takeaways for Legal Practitioners and Businesses

• Lawyers: Stay updated on emerging substitution practices to advise clients effectively.

• Developers: Maintain clean financial practices to qualify for relief measures like substitution.

• Investors: Factor in enforcement flexibility when evaluating Indian markets.

• Policy Analysts: Monitor similar cases for signals of upcoming legislative change.

Conclusion

The Roop Bansal case is more than a single dispute—it’s a turning point in how India may balance strict anti-money laundering enforcement with economic pragmatism. By recognizing the real-world consequences of asset freezes and exploring substitution mechanisms, the Supreme Court has opened the door to progressive legislative reform.

If lawmakers codify substitution under strict safeguards, India’s enforcement framework could become both robust and responsive, ensuring that justice is served without crippling legitimate enterprise or punishing innocent stakeholders. The journey from litigation to legislation is not new in Indian law—but in the context of economic enforcement, the Roop Bansal matter could be a landmark moment that reshapes the future of compliance, risk management, and business confidence in the country.