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Introduction

The issue of whether employers can claim income-tax deductions on delayed deposits of employees’ Provident Fund (PF) and Employees’ State Insurance (ESI) contributions has been one of the most litigated and confusing areas of Indian tax law. Over the years, different High Courts across the country have taken contradictory positions, leaving employers, tax professionals, and compliance teams uncertain about the correct legal position.

In a significant development, the Supreme Court of India has agreed to examine this issue and resolve the long-standing conflict. A Division Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Sandeep Mehta has issued notice in the case of Woodland (Aero Club) Private Limited Director v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (SLP (C) No. 1532 of 2026). The Court will decide whether an employer can claim a deduction under the Income-tax Act, 1961, for employees’ PF and ESI contributions that are deposited after the due dates prescribed under the respective welfare laws, but before the due date of filing the income-tax return.

Background of the Dispute

Every month, employers deduct certain amounts from employees’ salaries towards statutory welfare schemes such as Provident Fund and Employees’ State Insurance. These deductions are not the employer’s own money; they are amounts collected from employees and held by the employer for onward remittance to statutory authorities.

Under labour welfare laws such as the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948, strict timelines are prescribed for depositing these contributions. Delays attract interest, damages, and other consequences under the respective Acts.

The controversy arises under the Income-tax Act, 1961: if these employees’ contributions are deposited late under welfare laws, but before the due date for filing the income-tax return, can the employer still claim them as a deduction while computing taxable income?

For years, taxpayers relied on favourable court decisions that allowed such deductions. However, several High Courts, including the Delhi High Court, have taken a stricter view, denying deductions for delayed deposits of employees’ contributions. This divergence has now compelled the Supreme Court to step in.

Statutory Framework Under the Income-tax Act

To understand the controversy, it is essential to examine the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Section 2(24)(x): Employees’ Contributions as Income

Section 2(24)(x) includes within the definition of “income” any sum received by the employer from employees as contributions to PF, ESI, or similar welfare funds. This means that the moment an employer deducts PF or ESI from an employee’s salary, that amount becomes the employer’s income for tax purposes.

This legal fiction is crucial. It treats employees’ contributions differently from employer’s own contributions and forms the foundation of the revenue’s argument.

Section 36(1)(va): Deduction of Employees’ Contributions

Section 36(1)(va) allows deduction of employees’ contributions only if they are credited by the employer to the employees’ account in the relevant fund on or before the “due date.” The Explanation to this section defines “due date” as the date by which the employer is required to credit the employees’ contribution under the relevant welfare law.

In simple terms, this provision links tax deductibility directly to timely compliance with labour welfare statutes.

Section 36(1)(iv): Employer’s Contributions

Employer’s own contributions to PF and similar funds are governed by Section 36(1)(iv). These contributions are not treated as income under Section 2(24)(x). Instead, they are allowable as business expenditure, subject to conditions laid down in the Act.

Section 43B: Actual Payment Basis

Section 43B allows certain deductions, including employer’s contributions to PF and ESI, only on actual payment. Importantly, it permits deductions if payment is made on or before the due date for filing the income-tax return under Section 139(1), even if payment is made after the end of the financial year.

The controversy lies in whether this beneficial provision also applies to employees’ contributions covered under Section 36(1)(va).

Employer’s Contribution vs Employees’ Contribution: A Fundamental Difference

One of the central issues in the dispute is whether employer’s contributions and employees’ contributions should be treated alike for tax purposes.

Employer’s contributions represent the employer’s statutory obligation. These are business expenses incurred by the employer and are not first treated as income.

Employees’ contributions, on the other hand, are amounts deducted from employees’ salaries. The employer merely acts as a trustee or custodian of these funds. The law treats these sums as income of the employer under Section 2(24)(x), with deduction allowed only if strict conditions are met.

This conceptual distinction has been emphasised by courts that support the revenue’s position.

Divergent Judicial Views Across High Courts

Over the past two decades, Indian High Courts have expressed sharply divergent views on this issue.

View Allowing Deduction Before Return Filing Date

Several High Courts took a liberal and taxpayer-friendly approach. They held that both employer’s and employees’ contributions are covered by Section 43B. According to this view, if the contributions are deposited before the due date for filing the income-tax return, the deduction should be allowed.

This interpretation relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in CIT v. Alom Extrusions Ltd., which emphasised the intent of Section 43B to encourage actual payment rather than penalise delays.

Courts following this approach focused on substance over form, treating delays as procedural lapses rather than grounds for permanent disallowance.

View Disallowing Deduction After Statutory Due Date

Other High Courts, including the Delhi High Court, adopted a strict interpretation. They held that employees’ contributions are governed exclusively by Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x). According to this view, deduction is permissible only if the contribution is deposited within the due date prescribed under the relevant welfare law.

These courts reasoned that Section 43B applies only to employer’s contributions and cannot override the specific conditions imposed for employees’ contributions. They also distinguished Alom Extrusions on the ground that it did not consider Sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va).

The Delhi High Court’s Reasoning

The Delhi High Court, whose decision is under challenge before the Supreme Court, firmly supported the revenue’s position.

It held that employees’ contributions deducted from salaries are deemed income of the employer and are held in trust. The employer’s failure to deposit these amounts within the statutory due date results in a permanent disallowance.

The Court further ruled that the non-obstante clause in Section 43B cannot be extended to employees’ contributions governed by Section 36(1)(va). It also observed that Explanation 5 to Section 43B, which clarifies certain aspects of deductibility, does not dilute the specific requirements applicable to employees’ contributions.

The Supreme Court’s Intervention

Recognising the conflicting interpretations across High Courts, the Supreme Court has agreed to examine the issue.

In the Woodland (Aero Club) case, the Division Bench recorded that there are “two schools of thought” regarding the interpretation of the term “due date.” One school insists on strict compliance with welfare law deadlines, while the other allows deductions up to the return filing date.

Acknowledging the extensive and conflicting body of precedents, the Bench observed that the issue requires authoritative resolution and issued notice, returnable in four weeks.

Arguments of the Revenue

The revenue’s arguments are rooted in statutory interpretation and policy considerations:

1. Employees’ contributions are treated as income under Section 2(24)(x).

2. Deduction under Section 36(1)(va) is conditional upon timely deposit under welfare laws.

3. Section 43B does not apply to employees’ contributions.

4. Allowing delayed deposits would defeat the objective of protecting employees’ welfare funds.

According to the revenue, employers should not benefit from delays in remitting money that belongs to employees.

Arguments of the Assessee-Employer

The assessee-employer relies on principles of equity, consistency, and legislative intent:

1. The purpose of Section 43B is to ensure actual payment, not to impose harsh penalties.

2. Treating employer’s and employees’ contributions differently leads to arbitrary results.

3. Several High Courts have allowed deductions if payment is made before the return filing date.

4. Once payment is made, no loss is caused to the exchequer or employees.

The assessee also highlights the compliance burden and practical difficulties faced by businesses.

Practical Impact on Employers

Until the Supreme Court settles the issue, employers face uncertainty and litigation risk.

Tax assessments may disallow deductions for delayed deposits, leading to higher tax demands, interest, and penalties. Employers must also deal with inconsistent treatment depending on jurisdiction.

From a compliance perspective, the safest approach is to ensure that employees’ contributions are deposited within the statutory due dates under PF and ESI laws.

Possible Outcomes and Implications

The Supreme Court’s decision will have far-reaching consequences:

1. A ruling in favour of employers could provide relief and bring uniformity.

2. A ruling in favour of the revenue would reinforce strict compliance and increase tax costs for non-compliant employers.

3. Past assessments and pending litigation may be impacted depending on whether the ruling is applied retrospectively or prospectively.

Why This Issue Matters

This issue is significant because it affects millions of employees and thousands of businesses. Accurate interpretation promotes trust in the tax system, ensures employee welfare, and provides clarity to employers.

Courts must balance strict statutory interpretation with practical realities and legislative intent.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Woodland (Aero Club) case is expected to finally resolve the long-standing controversy surrounding the deductibility of delayed PF and ESI deposits. By addressing conflicting High Court rulings, the apex court will provide much-needed clarity and certainty.

Until then, employers should adopt a cautious approach and prioritise timely compliance with welfare laws. The forthcoming judgment will shape not only tax jurisprudence but also compliance culture in India.

Case Details

• Case Title: Woodland (Aero Club) Private Limited Director v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax

• Case Number: Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 1532 of 2026

• Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Sandeep Mehta

Introduction

In a significant and worker‑friendly interpretation of labour law, the Supreme Court of India has clarified that an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) does not require a prior written or formal charter of demands to be raised by workmen or their trade union before invoking the statutory machinery of conciliation. This landmark clarification reinforces the preventive and remedial purpose of labour legislation and strengthens access to justice for workers, particularly contract labourers who often operate in vulnerable employment arrangements.

The ruling came in M/s Premium Transmission Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 87), decided by a Division Bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti. The Court dismissed the employer’s challenge to conciliation proceedings, a government reference, and interim reliefs granted by the Industrial Court, firmly holding that the absence of a prior written demand does not negate the existence of an industrial dispute.

This judgment has far‑reaching implications for industrial relations in India. It clarifies long‑standing ambiguities, curbs dilatory tactics by employers, and re‑emphasises that labour laws must be interpreted in a manner that furthers industrial peace rather than procedural technicalities.

Background of the Case

The dispute arose from a group of contract workers, represented through a trade union, who alleged that the contractual arrangement under which they were engaged was sham and nominal. According to the workmen, although they were shown as employees of a contractor, the real control, supervision, and nature of work indicated that the management was the principal employer.

Instead of first serving a formal charter of demands on the management, the union directly approached the Conciliation Officer under the ID Act. The conciliation proceedings ultimately failed, resulting in a failure report under Section 12 of the Act. Based on this report, the appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Court under Section 10.

The management challenged this reference before the High Court, arguing that:

1. No industrial dispute existed in law.

2. No prior written demand or charter of demands had been served.

3. The Conciliation Officer lacked jurisdiction in the absence of such demand.

While the reference was pending, the workmen also filed a complaint under Section 33‑A of the ID Act, alleging illegal alteration of service conditions and cessation of work during the pendency of proceedings. Interim relief granted by the Industrial Court was affirmed by the High Court.

Aggrieved, the management approached the Supreme Court challenging both the government reference and the interim relief orders.

Core Legal Issue Before the Supreme Court

The principal question before the Supreme Court was:

Is a prior formal or written demand by workmen a mandatory precondition for the existence of an industrial dispute and for invoking conciliation and reference proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

Closely connected to this were related issues, such as:

1. Whether an industrial dispute can be said to exist or be apprehended without a formal demand.

2. Whether the appropriate Government exceeded its jurisdiction by referring the dispute.

3. Whether disputes concerning sham contract labour arrangements can be entertained without prior employer‑workman negotiation.

Understanding the Concept of “Industrial Dispute”

Statutory Definition

Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines an industrial dispute as:

“Any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.”

The definition is deliberately broad and inclusive. It does not prescribe any rigid or formalistic method by which a dispute must arise.

No Prescribed Mode of Raising a Dispute

The Supreme Court reiterated that the ID Act:

1. Does not mandate a written demand as a condition precedent.

2. Does not require that the dispute must first be raised directly with the employer.

3. Focuses instead on the existence or apprehension of a dispute.

This interpretation aligns with the welfare‑oriented nature of labour legislation.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Reasoning

Reliance on Established Precedent

The Bench relied heavily on earlier authoritative decisions, particularly Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (1978), where the Supreme Court held that:

1. The appropriate Government has the power to refer not only existing disputes but also apprehended disputes.

2. Any interpretation that nullifies the word “apprehended” in Section 10(1) would be legally impermissible.

The Court observed that the management’s argument effectively sought to read additional words into the statute, which is not allowed in statutory interpretation.

Formal Demand Is Not a Sine Qua Non

The Court unequivocally held:

1. A formal written demand is not a sine qua non for an industrial dispute.

2. What matters is whether there is a real dispute or difference relating to employment conditions.

The only statutory exception is in the case of public utility services, where Section 22 of the ID Act requires prior notice before strikes. Outside this limited exception, no such requirement exists.

Preventive and Remedial Nature of the ID Act

A key highlight of the judgment is the Court’s emphasis on the preventive function of the ID Act. The Court cautioned that:

1. Insisting on prior demands would delay intervention.

2. In many cases, raising demands with the employer may expose workers to victimisation or loss of employment.

The Court observed that allowing preliminary objections at the threshold would:

“Negate the preventive intent of the statute, converting a mechanism of immediate relief into an engine of delay.”

Role of the Conciliation Officer Explained

The Supreme Court clarified the limited yet crucial role of the Conciliation Officer:

1. The Conciliation Officer is not required to adjudicate disputed facts.

2. His role is to attempt settlement once a dispute exists or is apprehended.

3. Questions such as whether a contract is sham or whether the management is the principal employer fall within the domain of the Industrial or Labour Court, not the Conciliation Officer.

Thus, objections relating to the merits of the dispute cannot be used to block conciliation or reference proceedings.

Tripartite Relationship: Management, Contractor, and Workmen

Denial of Status as a Dispute

In contract labour cases, employers often deny any direct relationship with the workers. The Court held that:

1. Denial of employer‑employee relationship itself can constitute an industrial dispute.

2. Allegations that a contract is sham or camouflage necessarily involve factual examination.

Adjudication by Industrial Court

Recognising this, the Supreme Court directed the Industrial Court to frame and decide two specific issues:

1. Whether the contract labour arrangements were sham and nominal.

2. Whether, considering the nature of work, the management was the principal employer.

This approach ensures that substantive justice is delivered after proper adjudication rather than being defeated at the threshold.

Section 33‑A Complaint and Interim Relief

The Court also addressed the complaint filed under Section 33‑A, which allows workmen to directly approach the Labour or Industrial Court when service conditions are altered during pending proceedings.

The management argued that interim relief should not have been granted. Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court held that:

1. Interim protection is essential to prevent fait accompli situations.

2. Workers cannot be left remediless while legal proceedings are pending.

The affirmation of interim relief underscores the Court’s commitment to maintaining a balance of power during industrial adjudication.

Government’s Power of Reference Under Section 10

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that:

1. The appropriate Government’s role at the stage of reference is administrative, not adjudicatory.

2. The Government need only be satisfied that a dispute exists or is apprehended.

3. Detailed examination of evidence is neither required nor permissible at this stage.

Any attempt by employers to convert reference proceedings into mini‑trials was firmly discouraged.

Why This Judgment Is a Landmark

Strengthens Workers’ Access to Justice

By removing the insistence on prior written demands, the judgment:

1. Makes labour remedies more accessible.

2. Protects vulnerable workers from procedural traps.

Prevents Abuse of Process

The ruling curbs the tendency of employers to raise technical objections to delay adjudication.

Reinforces Welfare Interpretation

The decision aligns with the settled principle that labour laws must receive a liberal and purposive interpretation.

Clarifies Law on Contract Labour Disputes

It reaffirms that disputes over sham contracts are legitimate industrial disputes requiring adjudication.

Practical Implications for Employers and Workers

For Employers

1. Procedural objections will not easily stall industrial adjudication.

2. Greater emphasis must be placed on compliance and fair labour practices.

For Workers and Trade Unions

1. Direct access to conciliation machinery is reinforced.

2. Fear of retaliation for raising demands is reduced.

For Labour Administration

• Conciliation Officers and Governments can act decisively to preserve industrial peace.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in M/s Premium Transmission Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Others marks a decisive step in reaffirming the spirit and purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By holding that an industrial dispute need not await a prior written demand, the Court has ensured that labour law remains a tool of social justice rather than a maze of procedural hurdles.

The judgment strengthens preventive mechanisms, empowers workers, and reinforces the idea that industrial peace is best achieved through timely intervention and fair adjudication. In doing so, it sets a robust precedent that will guide industrial relations in India for years to come.

Case Details

• Case Title: M/s Premium Transmission Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Others

• Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 87

• Bench: Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice S.V.N. Bhatti

• Decision: Civil Appeal dismissed; reference and interim relief upheld

Introduction

Trademark law exists to protect identity, reputation, and trust. A trademark is not merely a logo or a word; it represents the goodwill an organisation builds over years—sometimes decades—of consistent use. When such goodwill is misused, especially in a manner that misleads the public, courts are duty‑bound to intervene.

The decision of the Bombay High Court in International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) v. Iskcon Apparel Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (2020) is a landmark ruling in Indian trademark jurisprudence. The case is particularly significant because it deals with the commercial misuse of a religious and charitable organisation’s name, and clarifies how even indirect references to a protected trademark can amount to infringement and passing off.

Background of the Parties

International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON)

The International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) is a globally recognised religious and spiritual organisation founded in 1966 by A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada. Over the decades, ISKCON has established temples, cultural centres, educational institutions, and charitable activities across India and the world.

In India, the name “ISKCON” is deeply associated with:

1. Hindu religious worship and spiritual teachings

2. Distribution of religious literature

3. Cultural programmes and festivals

4. Sale of authorised merchandise, books, and devotional items

Due to long, continuous, and extensive use, ISKCON holds multiple trademark registrations for the mark “ISKCON” under various classes, including Classes 16, 23, 24, 25, 35, and 42.

Iskcon Apparel Pvt. Ltd. / Alcis Sports Pvt. Ltd.

The Defendant initially operated under the name Iskcon Apparel Pvt. Ltd., engaging in the manufacture and sale of clothing and apparel products. These products were marketed online, using the word “ISKCON” prominently as part of the brand identity.

Subsequently, during the pendency of the dispute, the company changed its name to Alcis Sports Pvt. Ltd. However, as the court later observed, references to the former name and continued association with the ISKCON mark did not entirely cease.

Facts of ISKCON vs Iskcon Apparel Case

The dispute came to light in February 2020, when ISKCON discovered the Defendant’s activities during online searches. It was observed that:

1. The Defendant was using the word “ISKCON” as part of its corporate and brand identity

2. Apparel products were being sold under the ISKCON name

3. The use was unauthorised, with no licence, permission, or association with ISKCON

ISKCON contended that such use was misleading and capable of creating a false belief among devotees and the general public that the products were endorsed, approved, or connected with the religious organisation.

Despite issuing notices and summons requesting cessation of use, the Defendant failed to effectively respond or appear during the initial hearings. Even after changing its corporate name, the Defendant continued to use expressions such as “formerly known as Iskcon Apparel Pvt. Ltd.”, thereby maintaining a connection with the infringing mark.

This compelled ISKCON to approach the Bombay High Court seeking relief for trademark infringement and passing off.

Issues Before the Court

The Bombay High Court framed and examined the following key legal issues:

1. Whether the mark “ISKCON” qualifies as a well‑known trademark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

2. Whether continued or indirect use of the ISKCON mark, including references to a former corporate name, amounts to trademark infringement and passing off.

3. Whether a change in company name is sufficient to absolve liability when the goodwill of the original mark continues to be exploited.

Relevant Legal Provisions

The Court examined the dispute primarily under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, including:

Section 2(1)(zg) – Well‑Known Trademark

This provision defines a well‑known trademark as one that has become so recognised by the public that its use in relation to other goods or services would indicate a connection with the original proprietor.

Sections 11(6) and 11(7)

These sections lay down the criteria for determining whether a mark is well‑known, including:

1. Public recognition

2. Duration and extent of use

3. Geographical spread

4. Promotional efforts

5. Enforcement history

Section 135 – Reliefs

Section 135 provides for reliefs in cases of trademark infringement and passing off, including:

1. Interim and permanent injunctions

2. Damages or account of profits

3. Delivery‑up of infringing goods

Arguments Advanced by ISKCON (Plaintiff)

ISKCON argued that:

1. The mark “ISKCON” is inherently distinctive and uniquely associated with the Plaintiff

2. It has acquired immense goodwill through decades of global use

3. The term is not generic or descriptive but a unique acronym

4. Use of the mark on apparel and merchandise is already well‑established through authorised channels

The Plaintiff further contended that the Defendant’s conduct was deliberate and dishonest, aimed at unfairly benefiting from ISKCON’s reputation. Continued use of phrases like “formerly known as Iskcon Apparel Pvt. Ltd.” was said to perpetuate confusion and misrepresentation.

According to ISKCON, this amounted to both statutory infringement and passing off.

Arguments Advanced by the Defendant

The Defendant submitted that:

1. Iskcon Apparel Pvt. Ltd. no longer existed as the company had changed its name

2. An affidavit‑cum‑undertaking had been filed stating that the ISKCON mark would not be used

However, the court noted that mere assurances were insufficient when evidence suggested continued association with the infringing name.

Court’s Analysis and Reasoning

Recognition of ISKCON as a Well‑Known Trademark

The Bombay High Court carefully analysed ISKCON’s reputation, observing its extensive presence in India and internationally. Applying Sections 11(6) and 11(7), the Court found that:

1. ISKCON enjoys widespread public recognition

2. The mark has been used consistently over decades

3. It has significant geographical reach

4. The term “ISKCON” had no independent existence prior to the Plaintiff’s adoption

On this basis, the Court held that ISKCON is a well‑known trademark under Indian law.

Effect of Change in Corporate Name

A crucial clarification by the Court was that changing a company’s name does not erase prior infringement. Continued reference to the old name or indirect association can still mislead consumers.

The use of “formerly known as Iskcon Apparel Pvt. Ltd.” was held to be deceptive and capable of causing confusion.

Finding of Infringement and Passing Off

The Court concluded that the Defendant was trading upon ISKCON’s goodwill, which constituted:

1. Trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1999

2. Passing off under common law principles

The Judgment

The Bombay High Court granted an interim injunction, restraining the Defendant from:

1. Using the mark “ISKCON” in any manner

2. Making direct or indirect references suggesting association with ISKCON

3. Continuing the use of expressions linking the business to the earlier infringing name

The Court unequivocally recognised ISKCON as a well‑known trademark.

Why This Judgment Is Important

Protection of Religious and Charitable Identity

The ruling safeguards religious organisations from commercial exploitation and misuse of public trust.

Strong Message to Businesses

Businesses cannot rely on name changes or technicalities to escape liability for trademark infringement.

Strengthening Well‑Known Trademark Law

The case reinforces India’s commitment to protecting well‑known trademarks beyond registered classes.

Practical Takeaways

1. Always conduct trademark searches before adopting a brand name

2. Avoid using religious or institutional names without authorisation

3. Changing a business name does not cure past or ongoing infringement

4. Indirect references can still amount to trademark misuse

Conclusion

The ISKCON vs Iskcon Apparel judgment is a defining ruling in Indian trademark law. It reinforces that goodwill, reputation, and public trust—especially of religious and charitable organisations—are entitled to the highest level of legal protection.

By recognising ISKCON as a well‑known trademark and restraining even indirect misuse, the Bombay High Court ensured that trademark law continues to serve its core purpose: preventing deception and preserving authenticity in the marketplace.

Introduction: A Major Step Towards Financial Transparency in Real Estate

The real estate sector in India has long struggled with issues such as diversion of funds, delayed possession, stalled projects, and lack of transparency. While the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) was enacted to address these problems, practical loopholes continued to exist in how project funds were collected and utilised.

Recognising this gap, the Tamil Nadu Real Estate Regulatory Authority (TN RERA) has introduced a path-breaking financial control mechanism. Through an order dated 12 December 2025, TN RERA has mandated that every registered real estate project must operate three separate and designated bank accounts. This requirement applies to all project registrations and resubmissions received from 1 January 2026 onwards.

This move is aimed squarely at protecting homebuyer money, preventing cross-project fund diversion, and ensuring that money collected for a project is used only for that project.

Background: What RERA Already Mandates and Why It Was Not Enough

The Existing Legal Position Under RERA

Section 4(2)(l)(D) of the RERA Act requires promoters to:

1. Deposit 70% of the amounts realised from allottees

2. In a separate bank account

3. To be used only for land cost and construction cost

4. With withdrawals permitted only after certification by:

   1. Architect

   2. Engineer

   3. Chartered Accountant

This provision was designed to ensure project-specific fund usage and to prevent promoters from diverting money to other projects.

The Practical Problem Identified by TN RERA

Despite this legal safeguard, TN RERA observed a critical gap at the collection stage:

1. Homebuyer payments were often received in ordinary bank accounts

2. These collection accounts were not monitored by the Authority

3. Promoters frequently:

   1. Used one common collection account for multiple projects

   2. Transferred funds to the RERA account after delays

   3. Moved money between projects before regulatory oversight applied

TN RERA clearly noted that “there is no mechanism to monitor the collection account”, which defeated the very purpose of RERA.

The TN RERA Order of December 12, 2025: What Has Changed?

To close this loophole, TN RERA has introduced a three-tier banking system for every real estate project.

Applicability of the New Rule

1. Applies to:

   1. All new project registrations

   2. All resubmission applications

2. Effective for applications received on or after 1 January 2026

3. Mandatory compliance for:

   1. Promoters

   2. Developers

   3. Joint development projects

The Three Mandatory Bank Accounts Explained Simply

Under the new TN RERA framework, every project must have three designated bank accounts, all opened:

1. In the same scheduled bank

2. In the same branch

3. Specifically linked to the individual project

Let us understand each account in detail.

1. Collection Account: Where All Homebuyer Money First Lands

Purpose of the Collection Account

The collection account is the first point of entry for all money paid by homebuyers.

Key Rules Governing the Collection Account

1. All payments from allottees must be credited only to this account

2. No cash diversion or alternate accounts allowed

3. No withdrawals permitted

4. No cheques, transfers, or manual debits allowed

Automatic Sweep Mechanism

Funds can leave the collection account only through an automated sweep process, ensuring:

1. No human discretion

2. No delay in regulatory tracking

3. No opportunity for misuse

This mechanism ensures that every rupee paid by a homebuyer enters the regulatory ecosystem immediately.

2. Separate RERA Account (70% Account): The Core Safeguard

Mandatory Same-Day Transfer of 70%

1. 70% of the amount collected

2. Must be transferred on the same day

3. Automatically swept into the separate RERA account

Permitted Uses of the RERA Account

Money in this account can be used only for:

1. Land cost

2. Construction cost

3. Development work

4. Refund of principal amounts to allottees (up to 70%)

Conditions for Withdrawal

Withdrawals are permitted only after submission of:

1. Architect’s certificate

2. Engineer’s certificate

3. Chartered Accountant’s certificate

This ensures withdrawals are linked to actual construction progress.

Important Restriction on Refunds

1. Refunds from this account are capped at 70%

2. Prevents misuse of construction funds for non-project liabilities

3. Transaction Account (30% Account): Controlled Operational Flexibility

Transfer of Remaining 30%

1. The remaining 30% of collections

2. Automatically transferred to the transaction account

Additional Credits Allowed

This account may also receive:

1. Promoter’s own funds

2. Project loans (secured or unsecured)

Permitted Uses of the Transaction Account

Funds can be used for:

1. Marketing and sales expenses

2. Administrative costs

3. Loan repayments and interest

4. Compensation to allottees

5. Penalties imposed by TN RERA

6. Refunds up to 30% of payable amount

This account provides necessary operational flexibility while remaining fully traceable.

Special Rules for Joint Development Projects (JDA)

Two Sets of Three Accounts Mandatory

For projects developed under joint development agreements:

1. Two complete sets of accounts must be opened:

   1. One for the landowner

   2. One for the promoter

2. This applies regardless of the number of landowners or promoters

Why This Is Important

Joint development projects often face disputes over:

1. Revenue sharing

2. Fund utilisation

3. Responsibility for delays

Separate account structures ensure:

1. Clear financial demarcation

2. Accountability of each stakeholder

3. Protection of homebuyer interests

Stricter Disclosure Norms for Project Loans

Mandatory Loan Disclosures

Promoters must now disclose complete loan details, including:

1. Name of lender

2. Sanctioned amount

3. Disbursed amount

4. Outstanding dues

5. Mortgage or charge details

Chartered Accountant Certification

A CA must certify that:

1. Loan funds are used exclusively for the project

2. No cross-project utilisation has occurred

Disclosure of Post-Registration Loans

1. Any loan taken after project registration

2. Must be disclosed immediately

3. All repayments must be routed only through the transaction account

This brings unprecedented transparency to project financing.

Fixed Deposits from the 70% RERA Account: Allowed With Safeguards

TN RERA has permitted promoters to park funds from the 70% account in fixed deposits, subject to strict conditions:

1. FD must be no-lien

2. Cannot be used to raise loans

3. Cannot create charges or encumbrances

4. Maturity proceeds must return only to the same RERA account

This balances financial prudence with homebuyer protection.

Change of Bank Accounts: No Longer at Promoter’s Discretion

Prior Written Approval Mandatory

Promoters must obtain prior written approval from TN RERA for:

• Any change in:

  1. Bank

  2. Branch

  3. Account details

Post-Completion Withdrawals

Remaining balances in all three accounts can be withdrawn only after:

1. Completion report is issued by TN RERA

2. Authority communicates approval to the concerned bank

This ensures funds remain protected until the very end of the project lifecycle.

How This Order Strengthens Homebuyer Protection

Key Benefits for Homebuyers

1. Eliminates fund diversion at the collection stage

2. Ensures project-specific fund usage

3. Improves chances of timely completion

4. Enhances refund security

5. Builds trust in regulated projects

For homebuyers, this order translates into real financial safety, not just legal promises.

Impact on Developers and Promoters

Increased Compliance, But Greater Credibility

While promoters face:

1. Higher compliance costs

2. Increased disclosures

3. Tighter controls

They also gain:

1. Improved credibility with buyers

2. Better access to institutional finance

3. Reduced litigation risk

4. Clear financial discipline

Serious and ethical developers stand to benefit the most.

Comparison with Other State RERA Authorities

While several states enforce the 70% rule, Tamil Nadu’s three-account system is among the most robust and structured in India.

It addresses not just usage, but also collection, movement, and final settlement of funds, making it a potential model for nationwide adoption.

Practical Takeaways for Homebuyers

Before booking a property in Tamil Nadu:

1. Check if the project is TN RERA registered

2. Verify compliance with the three-account framework

3. Ask for disclosures relating to:

   1. Project loans

   2. Completion timelines

4. Prefer projects registered after January 1, 2026

An informed buyer is a protected buyer.

Conclusion: A Game-Changer for Tamil Nadu’s Real Estate Sector

The TN RERA order mandating three separate bank accounts per project marks a decisive shift from reactive regulation to proactive financial governance.

By bringing every rupee of homebuyer money under regulatory oversight from the moment of collection, the Authority has significantly reduced the scope for misuse, delays, and project failures.

For homebuyers, this is a powerful safeguard.
For ethical developers, it is a credibility booster.
For the real estate sector, it is a step towards long-term trust and sustainability.

Tamil Nadu has set a new benchmark—one that prioritises transparency, accountability, and consumer confidence at the heart of real estate development.

Introduction

Execution of a court decree is the final and most crucial stage of civil litigation. A successful litigant does not truly “win” until the decree is effectively executed. However, decree execution is often obstructed by third parties claiming independent rights over the property, particularly when property is transferred during the pendency of litigation.

In a significant and clarificatory judgment, the Supreme Court of India has once again reaffirmed a long-settled principle of law: a transferee pendente lite (a purchaser during the pendency of a suit) has no right to obstruct execution of a decree.

In Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors. (2026 INSC 52), a Division Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan interpreted Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) in light of the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA). The Court barred transferees pendente lite from resisting execution proceedings and directed delivery of possession to the decree holder.

Background of the Case

The dispute traces its origin to an agreement for sale executed in 1973 concerning immovable property in Maharashtra.

Timeline of Events

1. 1973 – Agreement for sale executed.

2. 1986 – Plaintiff filed a civil suit for specific performance due to failure of the vendor to execute the sale deed.

3. A notice of lis pendens was registered soon after filing the suit.

4. During pendency of the suit, the judgment-debtor transferred portions of the suit property to third parties through registered sale deeds.

5. One transferee even constructed a permanent structure on part of the land.

6. 1990 – Suit decreed in favour of the plaintiff, directing execution of the sale deed and delivery of vacant possession.

7. 1993 – Executing Court authorised execution of the sale deed through a Court Commissioner.

8. All challenges by the judgment-debtor failed; the decree attained finality.

9. When execution reached the stage of delivery of possession, the subsequent purchasers obstructed execution, claiming independent ownership.

This obstruction ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

Key Legal Issue Before the Supreme Court

The core legal question was:

Can a transferee pendente lite resist or obstruct execution of a decree for possession under Order XXI CPC?

To answer this, the Court examined:

1. Order XXI Rules 97 to 102 CPC

2. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act

3. Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act

4. Previous Supreme Court precedents

Understanding the Doctrine of Lis Pendens

What Is Lis Pendens?

The doctrine of lis pendens is embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It means:

When a property is the subject matter of a pending lawsuit, it cannot be transferred in a manner that defeats the rights of the other party.

Purpose of the Doctrine

The Supreme Court reiterated that lis pendens is based on:

1. Equity

2. Good conscience

3. Public policy

Its purpose is to prevent parties from frustrating judicial proceedings by transferring property during litigation.

Important Clarification by the Court

The Court clearly stated:

1. Transfer pendente lite is not illegal or void ab initio

2. However, such transfer is subservient to the final outcome of the suit

3. The transferee is bound by the decree, even without notice of the suit

Maharashtra Law and Registration of Notice of Pendency

In Maharashtra, registration of a notice of pendency is required under state amendments. The Supreme Court explained:

1. Registration benefits:

   1. The litigating party by strengthening lis pendens protection

   2. Third parties by enabling due diligence

2. However, absence of registration does not give an absolute right to a purchaser

The Court warned that allowing purchasers to escape lis pendens merely due to lack of registration would:

1. Undermine judicial authority

2. Encourage unscrupulous transactions

3. Defeat the very object of Section 52 TPA

Order XXI Rules 97 to 102 CPC: Explained Simply

Rule 97 – Resistance to Execution

When resistance or obstruction occurs during execution, the decree holder can apply to the executing court.

Rule 101 – Adjudication of Rights

All questions relating to:

1. Right, title, or interest in the property

2. Arising between the parties to the obstruction

Must be decided by the executing court itself—no separate suit required.

Rule 102 – The Crucial Bar

Order XXI Rule 102 CPC provides:

Nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite.

Supreme Court’s Interpretation

The Court held:

1. If the objector is found to be a transferee pendente lite

2. The executing court’s inquiry is limited to that single question

3. Once confirmed, no further adjudication is permissible

4. The transferee has no right to resist execution

This interpretation is consistent with earlier judgments such as Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust.

Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act vs Section 52 TPA

The appellants relied on Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, which protects bona fide purchasers without notice.

The Supreme Court clarified:

1. Section 19(b) applies before institution of a suit

2. Once a suit is filed, Section 52 TPA overrides Section 19(b)

3. After litigation begins, lis pendens takes full effect

Thus, purchasers after filing of the suit cannot claim protection, regardless of good faith.

Rejection of the Lala Durga Prasad Argument

The appellants relied heavily on the Supreme Court decision in Lala Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand.

The Court rejected this reliance, holding:

1. In Lala Durga Prasad, the sale occurred before filing of the suit

2. Section 52 TPA was not applicable in that case

3. In the present case, transfers were pendente lite

4. Hence, Lala Durga Prasad had no application

The Supreme Court fully endorsed the Bombay High Court’s reasoning on this point.

Findings of the Supreme Court

The Court made several critical findings:

1. Transferees pendente lite are bound by the decree

2. Notice or knowledge of the suit is irrelevant

3. Scope of adjudication under Order XXI is limited

4. Executing court acted correctly in removing obstruction

5. Decree holder is entitled to actual physical possession

Final Directions of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court issued clear and firm directions:

1. Appellants must hand over actual physical possession of the suit property

2. Deadline fixed as 15 February 2026

3. No further applications or petitions concerning the property will be entertained

4. Appeals dismissed with no costs

This finality ensures judicial efficiency and prevents endless litigation.

Practical Impact of the Judgment

For Property Buyers

1. Always conduct litigation due diligence

2. Check court records, not just title documents

3. Buying disputed property carries serious legal risk

For Decree Holders

1. Strengthens enforcement of decrees

2. Limits obstruction tactics by third parties

3. Ensures faster execution

For Lawyers and Courts

1. Clear guidance on handling objections under Order XXI

2. Reduces misuse of execution proceedings

Why This Judgment Matters

This ruling reinforces:

1. Sanctity of court decrees

2. Authority of executing courts

3. Stability in property transactions

4. Judicial discipline and finality

It sends a strong message that courts will not tolerate attempts to defeat justice through pendente lite transfers.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Order XXI Rule 102 CPC in Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale is a landmark reaffirmation of settled principles governing execution of decrees and property litigation.

By harmonising the CPC with the doctrine of lis pendens, the Court has protected decree holders, discouraged speculative property transactions, and upheld the rule of law.

For anyone dealing with property disputes or execution proceedings, this judgment serves as a clear legal roadmap—litigation cannot be sidestepped by clever transfers, and justice will ultimately prevail.

Case Details

• Case Title: Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors.

• Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 52

• Bench: Justice Manoj Misra & Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

• Decision Date: 2026